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Abstract
In this paper, we propose a light reflection based face
anti-spoofing method named Aurora Guard (AG),
which is fast, simple yet effective that has already
been deployed in real-world systems serving for mil-
lions of users. Specifically, our method first extracts
the normal cues via light reflection analysis, and
then uses an end-to-end trainable multi-task Convo-
lutional Neural Network (CNN) to not only recover
subjects’ depth maps to assist liveness classifica-
tion, but also provide the light CAPTCHA checking
mechanism in the regression branch to further im-
prove the system reliability. Moreover, we further
collect a large-scale dataset containing 12, 000 live
and spoofing samples, which covers abundant imag-
ing qualities and Presentation Attack Instruments
(PAI). Extensive experiments on both public and our
datasets demonstrate the superiority of our proposed
method over the state of the arts.
1 Introduction
Face anti-spoofing is currently a promising topic in computer
vision research community, and also a very challenging prob-
lem in remote scenarios without specific hardware equipped
in industry. The existing methods Liu et al. [2018]; Xie et
al. [2017]; Yi et al. [2014] on face anti-spoofing are paying
more attention on multi-modality information (e.g., depth or
infrared light). With the development of depth sensors, recent
methods and commercial systems exploit hardwares that can
be embedded with structured light (e.g., FaceID on iphone X),
light field Xie et al. [2017] or LIDAR to reconstruct accurate
3D shape, which can well address the limitation of 2D methods
towards high-level security Li et al. [2016, 2017]. Although
these methods can achieve good classification performance,
they highly rely on the customized hardware design, which
unavoidably increases the system cost.
As a replacement, recent advances on Presentation Attack
Detection (PAD) tend to estimate depth directly from a single
RGB image. In particular, since 3D reconstruction from a sin-
gle image is a highly under-constrained task due to the lack of
strong prior of object shapes, such methods introduce certain
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Figure 1: Framework of our proposed method. Fr denotes the
facial reflection frame. D denotes the recovered depth map from solid
depth clue, which improves our anti-spoofing performance against
unlimited 2D spoofing. r denotes the light CAPTCHA generated and
casted by light source, and rˆ is estimated by our method.
prior by recovering sparse Wang et al. [2013] or dense Atoum
et al. [2017]; Liu et al. [2018] depth features. However, these
methods still suffer from missing the solid depth clue. As a
result, the corresponding liveness classifiers are hard to gener-
alize to real presentation attacks in the wild.
Towards high accuracy and security without using depth sen-
sors, we propose a simple, fast yet effective face anti-spoofing
method termed Aurora Guard (AG). Its principle is to use light
reflection to impose two auxiliary information, i.e., the depth
map and light parameter sequence, to improve the accuracy
and security of PAD respectively (as shown in Fig. 1). In this
paper, we propose and define the light parameters sequence
as light CAPTCHA. By only incorporating a single extra light
source to generate the reflection frames, our method holds the
efficiency and portability of cost-free software methods, which
has already been deployed on smart phones and embedded
terminals that serves for millions of users.
More specifically, our method mainly consists of two parts:
(1) Based on Lambertian model, we cast dynamic changing
light specified by the random light CAPTCHA, and then ex-
tract the normal cues from facial reflection frames. (2) We use
an end-to-end trainable multi-task CNN to conduct liveness
classification and light CAPTCHA regression simultaneously.
The classification branch estimates the depth maps from the
normal cues, and classify liveness from the recovered depth
map via a compact encoder-decoder structure. The regression
branch estimates the light parameter sequence, which forms
a light CAPTCHA checking mechanism to handle one spe-
cial type of attack named modality spoofing, which is a very
common attack in real scenarios.
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Figure 2: Overview of Aurora Guard. From facial reflection frames encoded by casted light CAPTCHA, we estimate the normal cues. In the
classification branch, we recover the depth maps from the normal cues, and then perform depth-based liveness classification. In the regression
branch, we obtain the estimated light CAPTCHA.
Moreover, since the imaging quality (resolution, device)
and the types of Presentation Attack Instruments (PAI) are
essential to evaluate performance in practical remote face
authentication, we further build a dataset containing videos of
facial reflection frames collected by our system, which is the
most comprehensive and largest one in both aspects compared
with other public datasets.
To sum up, the main contributions of this work include:
• A simple, fast yet effective face anti-spoofing method
is proposed, which is practical in real scenarios without the
requirement on specific hardware design.
• A cost-free depth recover net is proposed to estimate
the facial depth maps via the normal cues extracted from the
reflection frames for liveness classification.
• A novel light CAPTCHA checking mechanism is proposed
to significantly improve the security against the attacks, espe-
cially the modality spoofing.
• A dataset containing comprehensive spoof attacks on
various imaging qualities and mobile ends is built.
2 Related Work
Local Texture based Methods The majority of common pre-
sentation attacks are the recaptured images shown on printed
photo and screens, in which the textures are different from the
original images and can be leveraged to counter face spoofing.
For example, Wen et al. [2015] adopted image distortion infor-
mation as countermeasure against spoofing. Li et al. [2017]
proposed Deep Local Binary Pattern (LBP) to extract LBP
descriptors on convolutional feature map extracted by CNN.
Boulkenafet et al. [2017] converted the face image from RGB
color space to HSV-YCbCr space and extracted channel-wise
SURF features Bay et al. [2006] to classify liveness result.
However, since the above methods operate on 2D images, they
still suffer from poor generalization ability to unseen attacks
and complex lighting conditions, especially when RGB sen-
sors have low resolution or quality. In contrast, our method
exploits 3D information (e.g., depth) via the reflection incre-
ments from RGB images, which makes our method more
robust and accurate to various attacks.
Depth Sensor based Methods It is well known that the 3D
facial cues can be used to defeat 2D presentation attacks. For
example, Wang et al. [2017] directly exploit depth sensors
such as Kinect to recover depth map and evaluate the anti-
spoofing effectiveness combined with texture features. Xie et
al. [2017] introduced a light field camera to extract depth infor-
mation from multiple refocused images took in one snapshot.
Moreover, iPhone X incorporates a structured-light sensor
to recover accurate facial depth map, which obtains impres-
sive anti-spoofing performance. However, although iPhone X
achieves high accuracy, there are two practical problems. First,
it uses an expensive 3D camera for accurate depth. Second, its
implementation details are missing. In contrast, our method
is not only hardware-free that has competitive results against
3D hardware via a cost-free depth recover net, but also easy to
follow for re-implementation.
Depth Estimated from Single Image Wang et al. [2013]
firstly attempted to recover a sparse 3D facial structure from
RGB image for face anti-spoofing. Atoum et al. [2017] pro-
posed a two-steam depth-based CNN to estimate both texture
and depth. Recently, Liu et al. [2018] fused multiple sequen-
tial depth predictions to regress to a temporal rPPG signal
for liveness classification. However, 3D reconstruction from
a single image is still highly under-constrained, since these
methods suffer from missing solid 3D information clue. As a
result, their anti-spoofing classifiers are hard to generalize to
unseen spoof attacks, and is also sensitive against the quality
of RGB camera. To address the inaccurate depth issue, our
method first obtains normal cues based on the light reflection,
which better removes the effects of albedo and illuminance.
Then we train a compact encoder-decoder network to accu-
rately recover the depth map.
Lambertian Reflection based Methods Tan et al. [2010]
firstly pointed out the importance of Lambertian modeling
for face anti-spoofing, while only obtains rough approxima-
tions of illuminance and reflectance parts. Chan et al. [2018]
also adopted Lambertian reflection model to extract simple
statistics (i.e., standard deviation and mean) as features, but
achieves limited performance. Our method differs from the
above methods in three key aspects: (1) We actively perform
light reflection via an extra light source specified by random
light parameter sequence, while the above methods do NOT.
(2) We construct a regression branch to achieve the novel light
CAPTCHA checking mechanism to make the system more ro-
bust, while the above methods again lack such scheme. (3) We
incorporate deep networks to learn powerful features, while
the above methods use simple handcrafted features.
Figure 3: The architecture details of the proposed multi-task
CNN. Here n denotes the number of output feature maps.
3 The Proposed Method
Fig. 2 illustrates the entire process of our method. Specifically,
we first set a smart phone (or any other devices) with front
camera and light source (e.g., the screen) in front of the subject.
Then, a random parameter sequence (i.e., light CAPTCHA) of
light hues and intensities is generated, i.e., r = {(αi, βi)}ni=1
given n frames. We manipulate the screen to cast dynamic
light specified by the light CAPTCHA r. After the reflection
frames Fr are captured, we sequentially estimate the normal
cues N , which are the input of a multi-task CNN to predict
liveness label and regress the estimated light CAPTCHA rˆ.
The final judgement is been made from both of the predicted
label and the matching result between rˆ and r.
3.1 Normal Cues from Light Reflection
Given the facial reflection frames {Fri}ni=1, we extract normal
cues by estimating the reflection increments on subject’s face.
Since objects with rough surfaces are diffuse reflectors (e.g.
human face), light casted onto surface point is scattered and
reflected, and then perceived as the final imaging in the camera.
Given images containing reflection on the object surface, we
measure the magnitude variations among different images,
under the assumption of Lambertian reflection model and
weak perspective camera projection.
Lambert’s Law regards the reflected part to be equal on all
directions on the diffuse surface. In other words, for any pixel
point p of the camera image under specific casting light Lr,
its intensity Fr(p) is formulated as:
Fr(p) = ρp(ka + krl · np), (1)
where ka is the ambient weight, kr is the diffuse weight, l is
the light source direction, ρp is the albedo and np is the point
normal. When light changes suddenly, ka and l (position of
the screen) are not supposed to change temporally and can be
regarded as constants. We adopt affine transformation to align
p′ and p between image pairs, with transformation matrix
estimated from the facial landmarks detected by PRNet Feng
et al. [2018]. Then in another image under casting light Lr′ ,
the intensity of the registered pixel p′ is:
Fr′(p) = Fr′(p
′) = ρp′(ka + kr′ l · np′). (2)
We then attain the scalar product N∆r(p) on each point,
N∆r(p) = l · np = Fr(p)− Fr
′(p)
kr − kr′ , (3)
where the scalar map arranged by N∆r(p) is the normal cue.
3.2 Multi-task CNN
After obtaining the normal cues, we adopt a multi-task CNN
that has two branches to achieve liveness classification and
light CAPTCHA regression, respectively. It should be noted
that our multi-task structure is task-driven, which enables
double checking mechanism to improve the robustness on
modality spoofing in practical scenarios.
Liveness Classification. Depending on the lighting envi-
ronment, the normal cues extracted from facial reflection
frames may be rough and noisy. To efficiently obtain ac-
curate depth information from the normal cues, we adopt an
encoder-decoder network, which balances the performance
and speed. The network architecture is inspired by Chen et
al. [2018]; Ronneberger et al. [2015], in which we use the
inverted residual block Sandler et al. [2018]. The recovered
depth map is then sent to a simple classification structure to
distinguish the real 3D face from those 2D presentation attacks.
The detailed structure is shown in Fig. 3.
After obtaining m frames of normal cues N1, N2, ..., Nm
of one video, the classifier has the following loss function:
Lcls = 1
m
m∑
i=1
{
− (1− λdepth)(cilog(C(U(S(Ni))))
+ (1− ci)log(1− C(U(S(Ni)))))
+ λdepth
∑
p∈Z2
−klog(edk(p)/(∑256
k′=1 e
dk′ (p)))
}
,
(4)
where S denotes stem operation that contains two convolu-
tional layers, C denotes the depth liveness prediction net, U
denotes the depth recover net, ci is the liveness label of the i-th
normal cue, λdepth is the weight of the depth estimation loss.
In depth recovering part, we adopt 2D pixel-wise soft-max
over the predicted depth map combined with the cross-entropy
loss function, where k : Ω → 1, ..., 256 is the ground truth
depth label, dk(p) is the feature map activation on channel k
at the pixel position p, while the feature map activation U(Ni)
is the output of the depth recover net.
Light Parameter Regression. We reinforce the security of
our method against modality spoofing, which is further dis-
cussed in Sec. 4.2, by customizing the casted light CAPTCHA
and exploit a regression branch to decode it back for double
checking automatically.
By feeding the same normal cues as the classification
branch, the regression net has the loss function Lreg as:
Lreg = 1
m
m∑
i=1
{‖R(S(Ni))−∆ri‖2}, (5)
where R denotes the regression net, ∆ri is the ground truth
light parameter residual of reflection frames Fri and Fri−1 .
Supposing there are V videos in the training set, the entire
loss function of our multi-task CNN is formulated as:
L(Θ) = arg min
Θ
1
2V
V∑
v=1
{Lvcls + λregLvreg}, (6)
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Figure 4: Statistics and attack samples of our dataset.
where Θ denotes the parameter set, λreg is the weight of
CAPTCHA regression loss. In practice, we set the light
CAPTCHA sequence to be composed by 4 types of light in
random order, which balances the robustness of CAPTCHA
checking and time complexity. We set the rate of light chang-
ing identical to the frame rate, thus the frames hold different
light reflection. The length of F, r equals tom+1. The Signal-
to-Noise Ratio (SNR) is adopted to check if the estimated
light parameter sequence matches the ground truth sequence.
3.3 Dataset Collection
As claimed in Sec. 1, various imaging qualities and the types
of PAIs are very important for practical remote face authen-
tication. To address this need, we collect a new dataset, in
which each data sample is obtained by casting dynamic light
sequence onto the subject, and then record the 30-fps videos.
Some statistics of the subjects are shown in Fig. 4. Note that
we mainly collect 2D attacks, the main target in most prior
anti-spoofing methods Atoum et al. [2017]; Liu et al. [2018],
rather than 3D ones because the cost to produce and conduct
3D attacks in real scenarios is much higher than 2D attacks.
Compared to the previous public datasets Chingovska et al.
[2012]; Liu et al. [2018]; Zhang et al. [2012], our dataset has
three advantages: 1) Our dataset is the largest one that includes
12, 000 live and spoof videos, with average duration to be 3s,
collected from 200 subjects, compared to 4, 620 videos from
165 subjects in Liu et al. [2018]. 2) Our dataset uses the most
extensive devices (i.e., 50 in ours vs. 4 in Liu et al. [2018])
to obtain good simulation of real-world mobile verification
scenarios. 3) Our dataset contains the most comprehensive
attacks that include various print, replay, modality and another
spoof face by light projector (see Fig. 4).
We divide samples into 3 parts through the spoof types: pa-
per attack, screen attack and other complex attacks consisting
of cropped paper photos, projection attacks, etc. In each part,
the data is further divided into train set, develop set and test
set, as shown in Tab. 1. Moreover, the amounts of live data and
spoof data stay equal in our dataset. The live data is collected
under multiple variations including interference illumination
on face, noisy imaging quality and different poses. The spoof
data are collected through abundant PAIs.
4 Experiments
4.1 Implementation Details
Model Training We use Pytorch to implement our method
and initialize all convolutional and fully-connected layers with
Table 1: Generalization experiment protocol. The train, development
and test set are divided into 3:1:1 within the samples in each part.
Part Type Samples Collection
Part 1 Paper Attack 2000 Phone No. 1∼17Live Person 2000 Subject No.1∼70
Part 2 Screen Attack 2200 Phone No. 18∼34Live Person 2000 Subject No.71∼140
Part 3 Complex Attack 1800 Phone No. 35∼50Live Person 2000 Subject No.141∼200
Table 2: Comparisons of EER from development set and HTER
from testing set in our dataset.
λdepth 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.5
EER (%) 4.79± 0.41 2.31± 0.23 1.58± 0.19 1.48± 0.21
HTER (%) 7.20± 0.77 3.53± 0.43 2.21± 0.31 2.09± 0.33
Table 3: Quantitative evaluation on modality spoofing.
Video 1 Video 2 Video 3 Video 4 Video 5
FAR 2/3000 0/3000 0/3000 1/3000 0/30000.06% 0.00% 0.00% 0.03% 0.00%
normal weight distribution He et al. [2015]. For optimization
solver, we adopt RMSprop Graves [2013] during training
process. Training our network roughly takes 5 hours using a
single NVIDIA Tesla P100 GPU and iterates for∼300 epochs.
Evaluation Criteria We use common criteria to evaluate
the anti-spoofing performance, including False Rejection Rate
(FRR), False Acceptance Rate (FAR) and Half Total Error
Rate (HTER), which depends on the threshold value τcls.
To be specific, FRR and FAR are monotonic increasing
and decreasing functions of τcls, respectively. A more strict
classification criterion corresponds to a larger threshold of τcls,
which means spoof faces are less likely to be misclassified.
For certain data set T and τcls, HTER is defined by
HTER(τcls,T) =
FRR(τcls,T) + FAR(τcls,T)
2
∈ (0, 1).
(7)
Lower HTER means better average performance on live-
ness classification, and HTER reaches its minimum when
FAR=FRR, which is defined as Equal Error Rate (EER).
4.2 Ablation Study
Effectiveness of Depth Supervision First, we conduct ex-
periments to demonstrate the effects of the depth supervision.
To be specific, we monotonically increase the weight of depth
loss λdepth in Eq. 4 and train multiple models, respectively.
Under each λdepth, we train 10 different models, and then eval-
uate the mean and standard variance of EER and HTER, as
shown in Tab. 2. When λdepth=0, the normal cues are directly
used for liveness classification, which achieves the worst re-
sults. As we increase the λdepth to give more importance on
the auxiliary depth supervision, the performance improves
gradually, which verifies its effectiveness to helps denoise the
normal cues and enhance the 3D information.
Light CAPTCHA Regression Branch Although our sys-
tem can well handle most of the normal 2D presentation at-
tacks via depth information, it may still suffer from one spe-
cial spoofing attack named modality spoofing, which directly
forges the desired reflection patterns. Specifically, modality
spoofing will fail our classification net when meeting 2 require-
ment: 1) The formerly captured raw video consists of facial
𝐶𝑙𝑠: Live person → √
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Figure 5: Illustration on our double checking mechanism.
Cls,Reg are the classification net and regression net, respectively.
1) The first row handles live person. 2) The highlighted yellow part
in the second row represents modality spoofing (i.e., xrT1 ), which
replays the formerly captured Hi-res video frames FrT1 that contains
true facial reflection, which fools the Cls but can be defended by
the light CAPTCHA checking scheme in Reg. 3) No interference
indicates the reflection effect caused by rT2 is blocked, thus FrT2
shares similar facial reflection with FrT1 and can pass the Cls. 4)
The bottom row indicates the conventional 2D spoofing case.
SNR = −0.2433 SNR = −0.1031 SNR = −0.3018 SNR = −0.3380
Figure 6: Illustration on estimated light CAPTCHA. Each figure
shows 10 estimated curves obtained by our regression branch (blue
dotted) from different subjects and scenes compared to the ground
truth (orange solid), where the x-axis and y-axis denote the time and
temporal variation of light hue α respectively.
Table 4: Comparison of EER from development set and HTER
from test set in our data set.
Method EER (%) HTER (%)
SURF Boulkenafet et al. [2017] 4.72 14.65
Deep LBP Li et al. [2017] 5.61 8.83
FASNet Lucena et al. [2017] 5.67 8.60
Auxiliary Depth CNN Liu et al. [2018] 2.55 5.36
Ours 1.24 1.91
reflection frames, that contains the true reflection patterns, is
leaked and replayed by Hi-res screen. 2) Within capture pro-
cess of attack trial, the casted light doesn’t interfere with the
original facial reflection in video frames. Fig. 5 illustrates the
principle of our light CAPTCHA against the modality spoof-
ing. We further conduct experiments to prove the effectiveness
of our light CAPTCHA checking mechanism in Fig. 6. The
|SNR| results of our regression branch are all below 0.35 and
close with the ground truth CAPTHCHA, which demonstrates
its ability to distinguish 4 types of casting light.
Next, we quantitatively verify the effectiveness of our
method against the modality spoofing attacks. We set the
light CAPTCHA formed as the compositions of 4 types of
casting light in a random order for every checking trial. To
perform modality spoofing, we record videos consisting the
same 4 types of true facial reflection (i.e., FrT1 in Fig. 5),
and repeatedly replay the video for 3, 000 times. In other
words, the fixed video loop must match the randomly gen-
erated CAPTHCHA to bypass our system. The experiment
results in Tab. 3 show that the light CAPTCHA checking mech-
anism highly improves the security on modality spoofing.
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Figure 7: Comparisons on depth recovery. We take the depth data
from Intel 3D camera as the ground truth. Results are computed
using the depth metrics from Godard et al. [2017]. The light blue
RMSE(log) measures error in depth values from the ground truth
(Lower is better). And the dark blue δ < 1.25 measures error in
the percentage of depths that are within threshold from the correct
value (Higher is better). Note that Aux Depth Liu et al. [2018]
recovers depth map from single RGB image, while ours recovers
from reflection frames which contain solid depth clues. The better
recovered depth enables our method to accurately classify liveness,
without additional texture or rPPG supervision.
4.3 Comparison to State-of-the-Art Methods
Depth Map Estimation Next, we conduct comparisons on
depth recovery against the recent state-of-the-art method Liu
et al. [2018], as shown in Fig. 7. We see that our method
can recover more accurate depth map on various aspects, such
as pose, facial contour and organ details, which demonstrate
the effects to recover depth from solid depth clue instead of
RGB texture. It should also be noted that our method achieves
comparable results to the Intel 3D sensor that can absolutely
detect 2D presentation attacks without failure cases.
Face Anti-Spoofing Here, we conduct comparisons on anti-
spoofing, in which our method and several state-of-the-art
methods are trained on our dataset (i.e., all the 3 training
sets in each part), and then tested on public and our datasets,
respectively. After training, we determine the threshold τcls
via the EER on the develop set and evaluate the HTER on
the test set. First, we conduct test on our dataset. Tab. 4
shows that our method significantly outperforms the prior
methods, where Aux Depth Liu et al. [2018] ranks 2nd, while
the conventional texture based methods Boulkenafet et al.
[2017]; Li et al. [2017] achieve relatively lower performance.
Next, we conduct tests on two public datasets: Replay-
Attack Chingovska et al. [2012] and CASIA Zhang et al.
[2012]. To better show the effectiveness and generalization of
our method, NO additional fine-tuning is performed. Since our
method requires casting extra light onto the subjects, the only
way to test the live subjects is to let the real person involved
in the public dataset to be presented, which is impossible and
unable us to measure FRR on public dataset. For the spoof
samples in these two public datasets, we print or broadcast the
videos to act as the negative subjects and evaluate the FAR
of various methods in Tab. 5. The results again demonstrate
the effectiveness and generalization of our method compared
to the state-of-the-art methods.
Figure 8: Generalization experiments with training and testing
pairwisely on every pair of sub-dataset combination.
Table 5: FAR indicator cross-tested on public dataset. Here to
mention we use the same model trained from our data set without
finetuning and same τcls to evaluate FAR on public dataset.
Method Replay-Attack CASIAFAR(%) FAR(%)
Color texture Boulkenafet et al. [2015] 0.40 6.20
Fine-tuned VGG-face Li et al. [2016] 8.40 5.20
DPCNN Li et al. [2016] 2.90 4.50
SURF Boulkenafet et al. [2017] 0.10 2.80
Deep LBP Li et al. [2017] 0.10 2.30
Patch-Depth CNNs Atoum et al. [2017] 0.79 2.67
Ours 0.02 0.75
Model Generalization Robust generalization ability is a
key characteristic for face anti-spoofing in real scenarios. Here,
we conduct generalization comparisons with a state-of-the-
art local texture based method Li et al. [2017], including
live subject identity, device sensor interoperability and types
of presentation attack. Specifically, we train both models
from training set of each part in our dataset, and evaluate the
performance in all three test sets respectively. Each model only
learns one type of spoof attack with partial subject identities
as well as device sensors, and the results are shown in Fig. 8.
We can conclude that: 1) Curves (a),(e),(i) show that both
models can achieve ideal FRR and FAR when training and
evaluating are performed on the same attack. 2) Curves (b),(d)
show that when testing on unseen attacks, the EER of Li et al.
[2017] degrades to ∼0.10 while our method is still below 0.04
with degradation of only ∼0.01. 3) Harder negatives from
complex dataset lead to worse performance, where the EER
of Li et al. [2017] in (i) rises from 0.03 to 0.22 in (h), while
our method only goes up to 0.13. 4) In the other cases, our
method retains half of the degradation on FAR and FRR,
which demonstrates its robust generalization ability.
Running Time Comparison We compare cross-platform
inference time with several SOTA methods. We deploy and
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Figure 9: Time Comparison between several SOTA methods and
ours in the aspects of effectiveness and cross-platform efficiency.
Table 6: FAR comparisons with SL3D. For each type of spoofing,
we attack the system 100 times and count the passing cases.
Spoofing Type SL3D Ours-AG
Paper Photo (rect) 0/100 0/100
Paper Photo (crop,twist) 1/100 0/100
Paper Photo (crop,carve) 1/100 1/100
Screen Video (iPad) 0/100 0/100
Projector Spoof 0/100 0/100
FAR(%) 0.40 0.20
compare on 3 common platform architectures: GPU for cloud
server, CPU (x86) for some embedded chips and CPU (arm)
for smart phones, as shown in Fig. 9. As we can see, our effi-
ciency on mobile platform still meets the application require-
ment and even outperforms some methods on CPU (x86). The
results indicate that our method achieves real-time efficiency
and is portable for cross-platform computation requirements
along with state-of-the-art anti-spoofing performance.
4.4 Comparison to Hardware-based Method
Finally, we compare our method with Structured-Light
3D (SL3D), which relies on the hardware that is embedded
with structured-light 3D reconstruction algorithm. To be spe-
cific, we use an Intelr RealSense SR300 3D camera to obtain
the facial depth map and adopt the same CNN classifier as in
our multi-task network for SL3D. In contrast, our method only
utilizes the ordinary RGB camera without specific hardware
design. To comprehensively compare our method with SL3D,
we only select and perform the hardest presentation attacks
that could cause failure cases of 2D texture based methods.
The results in Tab. 6 indicate that our method can achieve
comparable anti-spoofing performance compared to SL3D.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, an effective facial anti-spoofing method named
Aurora Guard is proposed, which holds real-time cross-
platform applicability. The key novelty of our method is to
leverage two kinds of auxiliary information, the depth map
and the light CAPTCHA based on light reflection, which sig-
nificantly improve the accuracy and reliability of anti-spoofing
system against unlimited 2D presentation attacks. Extensive
experiments on public benchmark and our dataset show that
AG is superior to the state of the art methods.
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